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There is a growing literature on the effect of electoral competition and democratic 
participation on issues such as corruption and government policy.  This paper studies 
the effects of political competition and democratic participation on welfare outcomes. 
We develop a model to assess the effects of electoral competition on human 
developmental outcomes and empirically test the key predictions using data on infant 
mortality rates (IMR) in India.  The empirical results provide strong support for the 
theoretical conjectures, which suggest that high electoral competition and high citizen 
participation in elections, rather than health expenditures, can explain much of the 
variation in IMR across different states in a democratic country like India.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the effects of special interest lobbying, electoral competition 
and democratic participation on the delivery of public services and human 
development outcomes in a developing country.   
 
A large body of literature suggests that rapid growth rates, coupled with high levels of 
investment in human capital, will eventually result in higher living standards (World 
Bank 2002).  In particular, when growth raises incomes above a threshold level, this 
provides a buffer against exogenous shocks that would otherwise result in mortality, 
deprivation, or famine.  However, “growth sceptics” have noted, that this mechanism 
relies upon the growth dividend percolating to the most vulnerable members of 
society – an outcome that is not assured and is likely to be achieved over the long run.  
In addition, the record of growth in recent decades shows that many countries with 
low per capita growth rates have succeeded in providing health services and meeting 
basic nutritional needs, while others with similar or higher growth rates have failed 
(Sen 1982). Thus it is insufficient to merely consider output levels in isolation, 
without focusing on ‘outcomes’
3. 
 
In this paper we provide a novel explanation to resolve this anomaly.  We argue that, 
for any given set of economic constraints (such as budgetary revenues, or per capita 
GDP), the level and quality of public services provided by a government in the short 
run is determined largely by political factors. Thus it is necessary to gauge the level of 
political willingness to tackle issues pertaining to human development.  Governments 
                                                 
3 Sen (1982)  has argued convincingly that in the case of the Bengal famine of 1942, outputs in the 
form of food production did not translate into the ‘outcome’ of food availability for all.   3
face multiple pressures when deciding on the allocation of their budgets across 
competing demands.  On the one hand well-organized special interest groups will 
lobby the government, through political contributions and other means, for various 
forms of sector-specific policy concessions.  However, such policy distortions come at 
a cost, if they lower general welfare, and this threatens the survival of the government.  
In a well functioning democracy, with a high level of political competition and a high 
level of political participation, there is a greater likelihood of a government losing 
power if its policies fail to provide for the needs of the electorate.  The government 
must therefore trade-off the private benefits of distorting policies in favour of special 
interest groups, against the possible political costs of neglecting the welfare of its 
citizens.  In a well functioning democracy voters can signal their preferences through 
the electoral system and hence the political costs of a policy distortion that lowers 
average welfare, will be larger.  Our theoretical analysis therefore predicts that, ceteris 
paribus, governments that face high levels of political competition, coupled with high 
levels of voter participation, will deliver better public service outcomes, than 
governments in regimes with low levels of either political competition or voter 
participation.  
 
We test the predictions of our theory on variations in the infant mortality rate
4 (IMR) 
across the states of India.  The empirical results strongly support the predictions of the 
model.  The focus on IMR within a given country seems particularly appropriate for 
our purposes.  First, as suggested by Conley and Springer (2001), is the sensitivity of 
IMR over a short time period to investments in public health care. Other indicators, 
like life expectancy, are expected to have a long lag. Another reason, for choosing 
                                                 
4 Infant Mortality Rate is defined as the number of deaths by age one, per thousand live births.   4
IMR in the current context, is that in India, public health is delineated as a ‘State 
Subject’ under the Indian Constitution. Thus, this parameter should identify, why 
certain regions of India have better health outcomes as compared to others. Besides 
this, IMR is also considered as a general indicator of “social upliftment” and a broad 
proxy for human development, as it is ‘a generally accepted social indicator of a 
nation’s health and quality of life, particularly for the poorest members of society.’ 
(Conley and Springer (2001) Pg 770).  It therefore serves as a useful measure of an 
important dimension of human development. 
 
The focus on a single country, with a federal system, also seems appropriate in this 
context.  Despite advances in medicine and public health, there still exist wide 
variations in infant mortality rates across countries. High-income countries have an 
average infant mortality rate of around 5 as compared to 80 in the low-income 
countries.
5  This is perhaps not unexpected, as more developed economies can be 
expected to have better medical facilities, nutrition and sanitation and hence superior 
health outcomes (Conley and Springer, 2001). However, somewhat more surprisingly, 
in India too, there is also substantial inter regional variation in the IMR.  In 1991, the 
state of Kerala had an IMR of 42, while in Madhya Pradesh it was 133.  On the other 
hand average per capita State Domestic Product (SDP) in these states were Rs. 8672 
and Rs. 6111, respectively – suggesting perhaps that the variation in IMR may be due 
to factors additional to economic growth. Closely related to this was that the impact of 
health expenditures on infant mortality was also weak. As pointed out by Deolalikar 
(2004), there is evidence ‘of a significant inverse association between infant mortality 
and government health expenditure.’  A second reason for focusing on a single 
                                                 
5 Human Development Report 2003   5
country is that it allows for a more precise interpretation of the empirical results.  
Many of the factors that vary across countries (such as political systems, trade and 
exchange rate regimes, judicial systems) are common within a country.  This implies 
that the there are likely to be fewer missing explanatory variables and unaccounted 
interactions in the regressions, resulting in a more controlled regression and 
coefficients that are more easily interpreted.
6 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review on infant mortality issues and the literature on political competition, 
Section 3 sets up a simple model based on the common agency framework of 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) to analyse the impact of electoral competition on 
health policy outcomes. The data and empirical testing is done in Section 4 and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
Section 2: Literature Review 
A number of studies have examined the link between IMR and developmental 
expenditures. Papers by Judge et al (1998), Babzano and Hillman (1994), Pampel and 
Pillai (1986), mostly corroborate the view that higher health care expenditures reduce 
IMR. However, these studies typically focus on developed countries and do not 
examine the political economy incentives that drive health policies. Thus, the paper 
by Judge et al (1998) considered variables like income-inequality, health expenditures 
as a proportion of GDP, social security transfers, and percentage of women in total 
workforce. Similarly, Babazano and Hillman (1994) did a cross-sectional study on the 
effects of health spending on IMR for OECD countries and found that the proportion 
                                                 
6  By way of example the impact of political competition in a US type of congressional system will 
differ from that of a parliamentary democracy – as in India.  By excluding regimes in the former 
category the coefficient on the political competition term can be interpreted with more accuracy.     6
of health care expenditure was not a significant determinant for IMR.  Conley and 
Springer (2001) also analyse the effect of state welfare spending on IMR for the 
OECD countries. They include a ‘fixed-effect’ variable in order to factor out the 
nation-specific effects. The study finds that state spending on welfare affects IMR 
both through social and medical mechanisms.  The evidence on the effects of 
government spending on IMR therefore appears to be mixed, suggesting that there 
may be other factors (such as political incentives), which determine the effectiveness 
of spending on health outcomes. 
There is a related body of literature that examines the role of politics in welfare 
spending. This issue has been analysed by Cameron (1978), Castles and Mitchell 
(1992) and Hicks and Swank (1992). In an early paper Cameron (1978) suggests 
causes for an increasingly pervasive government sector. He looks at five underlying 
causes - economic, fiscal, political, institutional and international and argues 
“democracy implies that the contenders for political office alter their programs in 
order to enhance their political appeal” (Cameron, 1978, p 1246). This can be in the 
form of reduced taxes or higher government expenditures (or both). This is perhaps of 
some relevance to a developing country democracy such as India where the bulk of 
voters do not pay taxes.  Cameron’s interpretation suggests that when the median 
voter pays no taxes, the government might use public spending as a way of securing 
political support.  
Hicks and Swank (1992) show that electoral turnout has a positive influence on 
welfare effort in 18 developed democratic nations. They further suggest that the 
presence of leftist or centrist governments also increase commitment to higher welfare 
effort.   7
A related literature based on the seminal work of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 
1996) examines the effects of lobbying on environmental policy choices.  The general 
conclusion emerging from this work is that greater political accountability leads to 
improved policy outcomes (Damania et al (2003), Deacon (1999), Murdoch and 
Sandler (1997), Deacon (2003), Triesman (2000), Rose Ackerman (1999), Johnston 
(1999)). 
While most of the empirical work in this area focuses on cross-country analysis, to 
our knowledge there has been no work on the reasons for variations in outcomes 
within countries. Typically, the literature associated with infant mortality, tries to link 
its effect on economic growth. Preston (1976) suggested economic development as a 
major factor in determining life expectancy. Bhargava et al (2001) also model the 
‘proximate determinants of economic growth’ by focussing on health and human 
development as determinants. Using panel data regressions, they find a positive effect 
of adult survival rates on the GDP growth rates in low-income nations. Similarly 
Younger (2001) approaches the growth issue by analysing declines in IMR. It uses 
lagged IMR data as a dependent variable for the change in IMR and then looks for 
absolute and conditional convergence, using other fixed effect variables like school 
enrolments, availability of healthcare etc. He finds surprisingly that health availability 
has no impact on declining IMR. 
The focus of our study is not on growth, but on the factors, that might affect health 
outcome levels. Thus we wish to study the quality of governance across the Indian 
States. Arguably, IMR, which is a good measure of the quality of health in a region, 
may be affected by economic, social and political variables.
7   Thus the existing 
literature does not explain adequately, why in a democratic country like India, there 
                                                 
7 As Sen (1985, 1987) suggests, poverty is the inability of an economy to achieve ‘ends’.   8
ought to be such large variations in infant mortality rates (Kerala 42 and Madhya 
Pradesh 133 in 1991). We suggest that part of the variation can be explained through 
the level of electoral competition within these states.  We thus synthesise the inter 
connected strands of literature and argue that political competition, as exemplified by 
both electoral competition and democratic participation, would force a government to 
focus on better governance through higher provision of public goods and therefore 
better outcomes on public welfare. 
  
Section 3: Model 
The model is based on Damania et al (2003) and attempts to analyse the effect of 
political competition on government policy. A small state economy consists of 
consumers and firms. A subset of these firms form a lobby group which attempts to 
induce the government to provide sector specific policy favours.  For concreteness we 
focus on the analytically simple case of a subsidy to production – though more 
general interpretations are possible.
8  However, the government must eventually face 
a budget constraint, which limits its spending options. Hence support for the lobbying 
firms implies that there is less available for other purposes, such as public health 
expenditures.  For simplicity we focus on the not unrealistic case where the budget 
constraint binds and is given by: 
where 
x c is government expenditure on public services
9 (like basic health) and s  is 
the government subsidy provided to the lobbying firms.  Citizens derive utility from 
                                                 
8 This is just one of many equivalent ways of assessing the effects of government support to a few. 
9 It must be specifically mentioned here that since the focus of this paper is on ‘outcomes’ rather than 
‘outputs’, 
x c refers to the effective public expenditure (on say health). Thus the citizens are not merely 
s c = G
x +    ( 1 a )          9
the public service c
x and a numeraire good y with constant marginal cost equal to 
one
10.  Citizen utility is thus 
= Ω ) , (
P P Z x
y c x u + ) (      ( 1 b )    
where xis the level of consumption of health expenditure,  ) (
x c x x = , is the health 
production function,   0 > ′ x  and  0 < ′′ x ,   ) (
x c u is a strictly concave and differentiable 
sub-utility function and 
P Z is the vector of any other factors which the consumers 
care about. 
The lobbying firms produce good z at a given price p
*11.  Production of z by each of 
the n identical firms is given by  i z , where  Z nzi = . The profitability of the lobbying 
firms depends in part on the subsidy (s) that they receive.  This in turn is determined 
by the amount of contributions  ), (s C
R  paid by the lobbyists to secure the subsidy, 
where 0 >
R
s C .  We later define how the subsidy and contributions are optimally 
determined.  For simplicity we assume that good z is exported. The cost of producing 
good z is given by  )), ( z ( i s v  where we assume  0 > z v , and  0 > zz v . Given the subsidy 
), s (  the profit function of each firm is:  
) ( ) , , ( ) ( s C s z p U s
R R R − = Π       ( 2 a )  
where, 
)) ( ( .
* s z z p U i i
R ν − =        ( 2 b )  
For future reference we note that differentiating Equation (2b) with respect to z  
yields the first-order condition 
                                                                                                                                            
concerned with the money that is spent in the health sector, but rather at the whole gamut of better 
health management. 
10 The good z does not enter the consumer’s utility function because we assume that this good is 
entirely exported. 
11 The world market price p
* is exogenously given as the producer is a price taker in a small state.    10







                (3)   
Thus firms produce up to the point where the price is equal to the net-of-subsidy 
marginal cost. 
The model defines a three-stage game, based on the following sequence of 
events.    
Stage 1.  Firms in sector  i z  form their own lobby group to obtain subsidies / 
support from the government. The lobby groups offer the incumbent government a 
specific political contribution for selecting a policy s.  The firms political strategy 
therefore consists of offering a political contribution schedule that links contributions 
to the subsidy received. 
Stage 2. The government then sets its optimal public expenditure policy, given 
the lobby groups’ strategies and the expected level of political rivalry that determines 
its survival after the election.  This is determined by the level of democratic 
participation and political competition in the next election. The government receives 
the political contribution from the lobbies.  
Stage 3 When the subsidy has been set, the firms choose their output levels. 
 
The n firms are sufficiently few that lobby group organisation is feasible.  On 
the other hand, the general citizens are many and dispersed and hence unable to form 
a coherent lobby group.  This is consistent with Olson’s (1965) assertion that large 
groups face substantially higher collective action costs than do smaller groups 
Aggregating equation (2b), the firm lobby’s indirect utility is given by  
), ( ) ( ) , ( s C s nU Z s
R R R R − = Ω         ( 4 )    
   11
where ) (s nU
R  are the lobbying firms’ aggregate profits, given the subsidy s  and 
R Z is the vector of all other factors that influence its profits (ignored in the model for 
simplicity). 
 
The incumbent government’s objective function is given by 
)) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( s s s C s G
P R R Ω + Ω + ≡ φ        ( 5 )    
where, C
R(s) is the political contribution paid by firms, γµ φ =  is an index for political 
competition, where γ  is the democratic participation rate and µ  is the level of 
political competition.  ) (s
R Ω is the firm lobby’s utility function.  ) (s
P Ω  is the 
consumer’s  utility function. 
Government utility,  ) (s G , is thus a weighted sum of the political contributions and 
the level of total social welfare.  As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), it is assumed 
that contributions are valued by the government for their many uses. They can for 
instance, be used for campaign spending or by the incumbent politicians’ for personal 
consumption’.  As suggested by Grossman and Helpman, social welfare is also valued 
because it increases the government’s chances of retaining power in the next 
election.
12 The weight given to social welfare (the sum of firms and citizens utility) 
depends upon the probability that the government remains in power.  This probability 
is affected by two factors: γ  which represents the expected democratic participation 
rate in the elections, and µ  which is the expected degree of political competition in 
election. We thus follow the influential work of Vanhanen (2000), who suggests that 
both political participation and political competition are necessary requirements for 
                                                 
12  In the context of a democratic system this is likely to occur if increases in aggregate welfare increase 
the welfare of the median voter, or the decisive group in a coalition. We do not explicitly model these 
issues which have been explored in great depth in the political economy literature (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2002)   12
democracy. This implies that in a democratic society, a politician would be more 
responsive to public policy decisions, if there exists an actively participating 
electorate and a significant opposition. 
An implication of this formulation is that a proportion  ) 1 ( γ −  of the electorate 
does not participate in the political process. This might be due to electoral apathy, or 
due to constitutional restrictions, which prevent a certain portion of citizens from 
voting.
13 What this formulation highlights is that if democratic participation is low, it 
will distort the government’s objective function in favour of special interest groups’ 
campaign contributions (or bribes). 
 
However  γ  is only a partial measure of the degree of democracy, because if all 
citizens are coerced into electing and there is only one available choice, there is no 
incentive for the incumbent to focus on social welfare or alter their policies in any 
way. Hence, the effect of democratic participation also depends crucially on the 
expected level of political competition,  . µ
14  
The equilibrium in this model has the structure of a common agency model by 
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) where several principals (the lobbying firms in our 
model) attempt to induce the single agent (the government) to undertake a certain 
action. This equilibrium maximizes the joint surplus of all parties, as discussed by 
Grossman and Helpman (1994). In our set-up, one condition that the equilibrium 
subsidy,  ,
* s  satisfies is given by  
                                                 
13  For instance in some countries exclusion is based on gender, in others it is based on ethnicity or 
religion.  
14 High levels of political participation without alternatives to choose from will have little relevance in 
deciding policy outcomes, e.g. elections in single party dictatorships (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).   13
) ) ( ( ) ( ) ( max *
P R R s s C s G Arg s Ω + Ω + ≡ = φ       ( 6 )
  



















φ  = 0  (7) 
 
Turning next to Stage 1 of the game, where contributions are determined, 
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Equation (8.2) suggests that the firm will pay contributions up to the point where the 
marginal benefits from a higher subsidy received from the government equals the 
marginal cost of higher contributions. In this sense, the contributions to the politicians 
by the firms are locally truthful, since they reveal the benefits of changing 
government policy. 
Substituting (8.2) into the first-order condition (7)
15 and using equation (1) defines the 
optimal policy of the government: 
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 (from equation 7.2).   14
Thus the government distributes its budget between the subsidy to lobbyists and 
expenditure on health to equate the politically relevant marginal benefits to the 
politically relevant marginal costs.  The former include the increase in contributions 
flowing from the higher profits accruing to firms, while the latter include the welfare 
loss resulting from a decline in public services delivered to the electorate.  The 
importance given to the welfare loss depends upon the expected political costs as 
summarized by the electoral effect (φ ). 
We now analyze the impact of electoral competition on the level of subsides 
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Thus the model yields the following prediction that we test in the following 
section: 
 Prediction: Higher electoral competition will lead to (i) increased welfare 
spending by governments and (ii) better health outcomes. 
 
Section 4: Data and Empirical Results 
 
  The existing literature on IMR, viz. Preston (1976), Bhargava et al (2001) 
Younger (2001) has mostly use a cross-country or pooled data to estimate the 
determinants of IMR. Typically, OLS estimators controlling for nation/region specific 
fixed effects have been used and in some cases a lag of IMR has been used as 
explanatory variables. Some of the major determinants of IMR have been identified in   15
the literature as, expenditure on public health, poverty levels, income levels, literacy – 
particularly female literacy and factors like the presence of doctors or medical 
facilities. The objective of our study is to analyse whether electoral competition plays 
a role in reducing infant mortality (through direct or indirect channels), after 
controlling for these factors. 
However, variables like expenditure on health, literacy levels and poverty levels 
might be correlated with political competition, hence OLS would give inconsistent 
estimates. Thus system estimation with good instruments would provide consistent 
estimators of the coefficients. This is what is attempted in the empirical exercise
16. 
We use pooled data for the 15 major states of India, for the period 1985-2000. The 
economic data are from the Reserve Bank of India’s annual report on Indian State 
Finances. The data on social indicators like IMR are drawn from the National Human 
Development Report 2001 – ‘The State of Human Development”
17. The data 
pertaining to State level voter percentage and the percentage of votes accruing to the 
opposition have been taken from the State election data released by the Election 
Commission of India. 
The variables used in the regressions are: 
Electoral Competition (ELCOMP)– In any democratic society, the voting pattern 
would determine the level of political competition. There are two components that 
determine the level of political competition. The first is the proportion of voters who 
                                                 
16 It must be understood that most empirical research on social policy focuses primarily on expenditures 
on welfare undertaken by the government. This is in a sense a measurement of ‘welfare effort’. 
However, it might be argued that unless one focuses on the quality of expenditure, the results might be 
inadequate. As a case in point Esping-Anderson (1985) argues: “ By scoring welfare states on 
spending, we assume that all spending counts equally. But some welfare states, the Austrian one, for 
example, spend a large share on benefits to privileged civil servants” (pg 19). We in our paper wish to 
distinguish between the ‘means ‘ and the ‘ends’ of public policy. The idea is not to negate the 
importance of the expenditure levels, but to also highlight in a sense the efficiency of expenditure. Thus 
we need a model where the developmental ‘ends’ and the ‘means’ will be determined simultaneously 
through the interaction of electoral competition. 
17 As data for most of these indicators are available at certain points of time, the data for the interim 
years have been projected, by calculating the compounded growth rate between those years.   16
exercise their right to vote. This component is important since it is a measure of voter 
‘activism’, which means that political parties have to tailor policies, which would be 
agreeable to the majority of the polity (see Vanhanen (2000) for a discussion). This is 
important for those countries where voting is not compulsory
18. The second measure 
of competition is the proportion of votes accrued by the opposition or the losers. This 
indicates the actual level of political competition and choice. Closely following 
Vanhanen (2000) we define electoral competition similarly. Health expenditure per 
capita (MEDPC) was calculated by dividing the expenditure on public health with the 
population of each State. Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) – defined as the number of 
deaths of children under 12 months per 1000 live births. Share of Agriculture in State 
output (AGRISDP). State Output per capita Factor Cost (SDPPC). Revenue Deficit 
Per capita (RDPC) and Health expenditure as a ratio to State Domestic Product 
(HEALTHSDP) which was calculated by the authors by dividing expenditure on 
public health with the output of each State. Female literacy in rural areas 
(FEMRURLITERACY) was included as a control variable, as was the Proportion of 
births handled by health professionals in rural areas (HEALTHPROF) (See Appendix 
for data and its sources). 
We consider IMR to be a function of electoral competition, health expenditure, 
poverty and other variables. However, health expenditure itself might be a function of 
electoral competition. Thus there may exist a simultaneity bias in the equation. This 
can be solved using two-staged least squares (TSLS) in a simultaneous equation 
system. 
The model that we test is: 
 
                                                 
18 Unlike say Australia   17
it it it it agrisdp elcomp medpc imr ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( 4 3 2 1 α α α α + + + =     
   1 7 6 5 ) log( ) log( ) log( ε α α α + + + + sdppc healthprof racy femrurlite  (1) 
2 4 3 2 1 ) log( ) log( ) log( ε β β β β + + + + = it it it rdpc sdppc elcomp medpc    (2) 
 
where the variables have been defined earlier
19.  
We use two measures of health expenditure to test the predictions of the models. The 
first is medical expenditures per capita  it medpc  and the other  it healthsdp . We expect 
the coefficient of  it medpc  ) ( it healthsdp in equation (1) to be negative, indicating that 
higher medical expenditures per capita should reduce the infant mortality rate of a 
region. Similarly, we expect high electoral competition to also lower infant mortality 
because of the need for political parties to show better ‘output delivery’. Thus the 
coefficient for  it elcomp is also expected to be negative. The coefficient of  it agrisdp  is 
expected to be positive, because share of agriculture in total output may proxy   
poverty
20 and high poverty is expected to contribute to higher infant mortality. The 
coefficient of  it sdppc is expected to be negative because higher incomes should 
reduce infant mortality. Similarly higher female literacy  ) ( it racy femrurlite should 
also have a negative impact on infant mortality, as should the presence of more health 
professionals ) ( it healthprof . 
Moving on to equation (2), as suggested by theory, higher electoral competition 
should make governments focus on developmental expenditures like health and 
sanitation. Thus the coefficient of  it elcomp is expected to have a positive sign. The 
                                                 
19 We use log(elcomp), log(agrisdp), log(sdppc) and rdpc(-1), urbanisation, vaccination of women in 
rural areas and a budgetary institution index as instruments (as they are the exogenous and pre 
determined variables in the system). We do a Hausman Specification test to confirm that the residuals 
are not significantly different from zero and hence the instruments may be considered to be valid. 
20 A positive correlation of 0.3 between poverty and share of agriculture in SDP confirms this. More 
generally it is well known that most of India’s poor live in rural areas and are in the agricultural sector.   18
greater the per capita state output, the greater ought to be the level of medical 
expenditure per capita. On the other hand, the higher is the income of the people, the 
lesser would be their reliance on State funds, consequently, the sign of the coefficient 
of  it sdppc  is ambiguous. The sign of the last variable, viz revenue deficit is 
ambiguous.  It could be argued that a higher revenue deficit would translate into 
higher expenditures on public health. On the other hand, a higher revenue deficit 
could act as a constraint on discretionary expenditures. Thus the sign of  it rdpc  is 
ambiguous. 
Results 
Tables 1 and 2 give the results of the econometric exercise. The results of Table 1 are 
consistent with the model. Note that  it medpc  is not significant, when  it imr  is the 
dependent variable. This confirms Deolalikar’s (2004) assertion that increasing levels 
of per capita medical expenditures have no impact on infant mortality. However, the 
key result is that higher electoral competition reduces infant mortality. Higher 
incomes ) ( it sdppc and more health professionals have a significant and negative effect 
on infant mortality. This view is further corroborated in the second equation of Table 
1, which shows that higher electoral competition has a positive impact on health 
expenditures. Similarly as income per capita rises  ) ( it sdppc it  leads to an increase in 
per capita health expenditure as well.  This suggests that economic growth is also an 
important determinant of IMR. The coefficient of  it agrisdp  and  it racy femrurlite  is of 
the right sign but is statistically insignificant, as is the case with  it rdpc . 
Table 2 runs the same model with health expenditure as a share of state output 
( it healthsdp  ) as one of the dependent variables. There appear to be some differences 
in results in this case. First of all, the key results remain unchanged, viz. that electoral   19
competition increases health expenditure as a share of state GDP and that electoral 
competition impacts negatively on IMR. Both of these are significant. Poverty as 
measured by the share of agriculture in State GDP appears to have no impact in infant 
mortality. Here too  it healthsdp  appears to have no effect IMR in the first equation of 
Table 2 corroborating Deolalikar’s (2004) findings. One possible explanation for this 
counterintuitive result is that this reflects purely wasteful public expenditure.  That is, 
merely enhancing expenditure on health has no impact on the ‘outcome’ of infant 
mortality
21. The number of health professionals have a significant impact on reducing 
IMR, however the coefficients of  it agrisdp ,  it sdppc and  it racy femrurlite  are not 
significant. Surprisingly in the second equation, income appears to be negatively 
related to health expenditures as a proportion of SDP. In other words, poorer income 
levels are associated with relatively higher levels of health expenditure as a share of 
State GDP. In other words,  it healthsdp  could in fact be capturing the effects of a 
higher incidence of poverty and hence IMR in a state, 
Conclusion 
This paper explores the role of electoral competition on government policy outcomes. 
Our empirical research for the Indian regional government shows, what our model 
predicts, that increased political competition, would lead a government to prioritise 
more on public welfare and on ensuring better outcomes for citizens. The transmission 
channels of how electoral competition impacts upon the ‘outcomes’ are still unclear, 
as is shown by our empirical exercise, where in one case it is straight forward as a 
higher electoral competition leads to higher per capita health expenditures, which in 
                                                 
21  A possible explanation that is consistent with recent World Bank household surveys conducted in 
the state of Andhra Pradesh, is that environmental factors (such as indoor pollution, pesticide exposure 
and contaminated water) are the main cause of IMR amongst the vulnerable poor, and that health 
interventions are ultimately ineffectual when infants are consistently exposed to these risks (World 
Bank 2001).  If this were the case, health expenditure could have no impact on IMR.    20
turn would impact upon the ‘outcome’ of infant mortality levels. However, it appears 
that electoral competition does have a ‘direct’ impact on IMR levels, possibly through 
ensuring better management and policies. This is revealed in our empirical models, 
where even though health expenditure has a no impact on IMR, electoral competition 
appears to reduce infant mortality. We believe that these results are particularly 
significant in the context of developing democratic nations like India. 
The other conclusion that we can arrive at is a realisation that the major issue is not 
one of centralisation or decentralisation of government; rather it is one of the levels of 
political competition. To the extent that there exists multiple avenues for political 
competition in a decentralised world, there will be a higher probability of the 
electorate ensuring better outcomes. In such a situation, a decentralised system of 
governance is preferred to a centralised one, where there might be a ‘risk’ of a 
democracy ‘locking’ itself into a low competition environment and thereby getting 
poor outcomes for itself.  21


























































































Figures in brackets refer to t – statistics 
** significant at 1% level or below 
* significant at 5% level   22























































































Figures in brackets refer to t – statistics 
** significant at 1% level or below 
* significant at 5% level   23
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Appendix 2: Average Values (1985-2000) of the variables used in empirical analysis
States IMR SDPPC ELCOMP MEDPC AGRISDP HEALTHSDP RDPC FEMRURLITERACYHEALTHPROF
(Rs.) (Rs.) (%) (%) (Rs.) (%) (%)
Andhra Pradesh 54 7354.4 0.38 66.4 28.2 1.01 104.6 27.1 41.0
Assam 90 5499.0 0.45 67.0 34.7 1.29 18.3 54.2 14.4
Bihar 74 3524.0 0.41 38.6 42.1 1.12 59.2 19.6 14.5
Gujarat 76 10080.0 0.24 81.8 18.8 0.87 137.8 38.8 33.2
Haryana 51 10677.7 0.41 70.8 37.8 0.72 159.7 34.1 24.8
Karnataka 73 7904.8 0.40 79.9 30.1 1.09 60.0 36.1 40.5
Kerala 41 8671.6 0.47 97.7 23.0 1.28 205.1 83.9 87.7
Madhya Pradesh 132 6111.0 0.32 53.7 33.9 0.91 73.5 24.0 22.1
Maharashtra 72 11401.7 0.39 80.7 16.6 0.83 145.5 43.2 37.8
Orissa 123 4888.2 0.32 55.5 32.9 1.19 161.3 33.0 17.3
Punjab 72 11914.0 0.12 106.5 43.3 0.94 378.5 45.4 45.4
Rajasthan 85 6371.9 0.33 75.9 31.5 1.23 131.1 15.5 18.5
Tamil Nadu 53 9005.9 0.41 90.7 19.2 1.11 177.5 43.1 60.7
Uttar Pradesh 97 5261.1 0.32 50.6 36.0 1.04 142.6 21.7 12.0
West Bengal 60 7345.4 0.40 71.6 27.8 1.03 205.0 39.8 24.1
IMR: Infant mortality rates per 1000 live births
SDPPC: State Domestic Product per capita
ELCOMP: Electoral Competition
MEDPC: Medical Expenditure Per Capita
AGRISDP: Share of Agriculture in State Domestic Product
HEALTHSDP: Share of Medical Expenditure in State Domestic Product
FEMRURLITERACY: Percent of female literacy in rural areas
HEALTHPROF: Percent of births carried out by health professionals in rural areas  25
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